Psychiatric Nosology
The last 20 years or so have seen a revival of interest in nosology. This has in part at least very practical reasons. One reason is the discovery of a large number of often very potent therapies, particularly drugs, and this has necessitated the conducting of replicable therapeutic trials. The method oftarget symptoms (I) proved usable only if the target symptoms (I) were observed within the framework of diagnostically homogeneous groups. The other reason was the fast development of psychiatric epidemiology. The counting of symptoms only, when attempted, led into endlessness, showing prevalence rates which engulfed the entire population (2) . Therapeutic research (that IS, drug trials) and epidemiology use methods which have much in common, drug trials being as it were applied epidemiology, and it is not surprising that neither can operate while ignoring diagnostic issues.
Hooton and Hooton in this issue of the Journal (p, 120) say that Kraepelin had brought order into psychiatric nosology. The enormity of his achievement can be gleaned from an essay by him on "100 Years of Psychiatry" (3). He casts a wistful eye over the field as he found it before he began. His results were not "unresisted;" on the contrary they continued to be fiercely criticized with many objections to his categories, particularly in the area of the functional psychoses.
When preparing his textbook Kraepelin thoroughly reviewed the literature up to date, in particular the French literature and the various syndromes described there. He states (3): "French clinicians can boast brilliant accomplishments in this direction; the long and unbroken tradition of the Parisien school (since Esquirol), unparalleled opportunities for observation in the metropolis, good logic, and unparalleled talent for observing and reporting facts contributed to their success."
The French influence on Kraepelin's work is very visible in his chapter on Dementia Praecox, particularly in the section on the paraphrenias, and also in the chapter on Paranoia. On paraphrenia he says: "... in spite of much similarity with the features of dementia praecox the inner cohesion of psychic life is much less damaged because of the lesser development of the affective and volitional disturbances." The delusional formations dominate the clinical picture (vol. 2 p. 973).
The clinical symdrome of "delire chronique it evolution systematique" described by Magnan is the main model ofKraepelin's "paraphrenia systematica," although some of Magnan's cases seem to fall into Kraepelin's "paranoia." Dupre's "delire d'imagination" in which pure imagination and falsified memories seem to be the driving force for the development of delusions is entirely included in Kraepelin's "paranoia." Serieux's "delire d'interpretation" is considered by Kraepelin to be a form of paranoia, whereas his "delire de revendication" has similarities to the "delusions of querulance," later masterfully described by E. Kretschmer (4) , as one form of his "expansive personalities." The "delire d'imagination" described by Dupre and Logre, and the case descriptions by Serieux and Capgras also find their place in Kraepelin's literary summary to his paranoia.
Kraepelin is nothing if not tentative about his "system." He states: "Many of the defined disease entities are merely attempts to bring some of the rich material supplied by observation at least for the time being into a teachable form. Only further 85 clinical research will gradually bring some clarity as to the true validity, the scope and the relationship of each entity to the others ... a very considerable number of cases cannot be simply accommodated in one or the other groups in our 'system."
The fact that Pichot, quoted by the Doctors Hooton, found that French psychiatrists still use the diagnosis created by earlier authors in France, testifies to the force of the original description of these syndromes. Once read they are remembered and recognized in the patients who come to the clinics and hospitals. As has been shown they have been and can be accommodated in the Kraepelinian "system." If necessary this accommodation can besuitably qualified as was indeed done by Kraepelin. If Kraepelin could be tentative about his "system" so must we be. It would, however, serve no useful purpose to produce alternatives to 'any system just for its own sake. A scientific classification must aim at defining diseases which have a common etiology, or at least with increasing knowledge are likely to turn out to have such a nosological character.
To establish claims for reclassification the demonstration of frequent diagnostic labelling is not enough. Various methods of demonstrating reliability of diagnosis have been developed, particularly in the transcultural studies. The development of methodical phenomenology makes symptom description more reliable, and has been used in "test" procedures' with symptom check lists. The forthcoming English translation of the AMDPS (5) check list with a glossary defining each term, developed by germanophone and francophone psychiatrists, will greatly assist that kind of research. Finally, validity studies using course and outcome, genetic characteristics and therapeutic response, will have to be undertaken, as well as studies ofthe underlying pathology.
If shortcuts are sought in "creating" new systems we will lose ourselves in endless reshuffling of the same old cards. In the meantime reading these classical case studies will always be rewarding to the modern clinician. The worst that can happen to our discipline is for us to indulge in smugness and to close our minds. With all our uncertainties this is the last thing we can afford.
In the natural sciences old views and interpretations of obser-'vation are overtaken by new discoveries and retain historical interest only; in the humanities this is never quite the case. Psychiatry has one foot in each of these disciplines and our heritage is not something we can simply leave to the historians.
